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Abstract
Nigeria attained independence on October 1st 1960 as 
a nation-state comprised of divergence ethnic clusters. 
By the time of independence, the country was set on the 
footpath of democratization by the colonial state. The 
effort at democratization was short-lived by the military 
coup that claimed the lives of many civilians. The 
political threshold is therefore attributed to the nauseating 
root of political assassination that scaled through many 
political transitions in the post-independence Nigeria. 
This paper interrogates the interplay between party 
politics, stratocracy and political related carnages since 
termination of colonial occupation in Nigeria. The study 
traces the major political assassination cases from 1966 
to 2016. Drawing upon massive political killings, the 
article explains the root cause of immoral ecology of 
politically related murders and its horrible implications. 
It found that the deplorable military cosmopolitan 
governance, skyrocket political factionalism, cataclysmic 
ethno-religious politics, avalanche criminalization of the 
political party system, hegemonic political incumbency 
and faltering judicial system elicit contagious politically 
motivated killings in Nigeria. The paper concludes by 
providing recommendation that application of intra-
party and inter-party dialogues become a mechanism for 
averting political homicide in political engagements and 
electioneering. To this end, there is a need for Nigerian 
political elites to eschew from inflammatory catch phrase 
such as “do-or-die” “rig and roast” and other grumbling 
words that encourages political bloodbath. Hence, 
sanitization of politics that extricate narcissistic interest is 
a pungent bludgeon to sustain political civility in Nigerian 
emerging democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Violence has never been an instrument used by us, as founding 
fathers of the Nigerian Republic, to solve political problems. …
I consider it most unfortunate that our “Young Turks” decided 
to introduce the element of violent revolution into Nigerian 
politics. No matter how they and our general public might have 
been provoked by obstinate and perhaps grasping politicians, 
it is an unwise policy…. As far as I am concerned, I regard 
the killings of our political and military leaders as a national 
calamity….1
My job is to obliterate military targets through the use of 
destructive force. I must debilitate the enemy through killing 
enemy soldiers and reduce the enemy’s arsenals. In the process, 
some civilians may be harmed or killed. But that country’s 
leaders have acted unconsciously and pose a threat to peace. So 
the enemy’s must be attacked. I harbor no malice toward the 
human beings who will be destroyed through my actions. I am 
following the commands of my superior officers. My country 
is depending upon me. It is my duty to fight when summons to 
fight. (Calhoun, 2002, pp.2-3)
The foregoing postulations demonstrate the importation 
of violence, state sponsored assassination/military coups 
and paid killings, fixated in democratic political lexicon, 
such conjecture lends credence to Nigeria’s political arena 
1 See Nnamdi Azikwe quoted in Omoigui (undated) Operation 
“Aure”: The Northern Military Counter-Rebellion of July 1966. 
Retrieved 2015, December 12 from http://www.Africamasterweb.
com/countercoup
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as animated haven and organic vibes for power mongers, 
political barons, godfathers, criminal syndicates, rogue, 
mafia-like politicians and dictatorial power huntsmen 
that considered political leadership a money-spinning 
profession. Central to the Nigerian political discourse is 
the conviction observed by Richard Joseph, he posited 
that “ambivalent nature of state power, inherited from the 
colonial era expanded considerably since independence 
in ways which have deepened this ambivalence” (Joseph, 
1983). Moreover, the configuration of Nigeria’s society 
embedded in multi-ethnic clusters constructs a beneficial 
political atmosphere for political brokers who exploit 
the opportunity to foster personal accumulation through 
the political pitfall created by the colonial institution. 
Similarly, Claude Ake put forward a facsimile replication 
of Nigerian socio-political impasse, he posited that,
the crux of the problem is the over-politicization of social life 
....we are intoxicated with politics: The premium on political 
power is so high that we are prone to take the most extreme 
measures in order to win and maintain political power; our 
energy tends to be channeled into the struggle for power to the 
detriment of economically productive efforts.2 
The extreme measures taken by most politicians in 
winning election demand Nigeria’s depreciative stance in 
Africa, as rightly noted by Margery Parham that, Nigeria’s 
titular edifice as “giant of Africa” began to crumple as a 
result of political assassination that thwarts the political 
events of January 1966 in which authoritarian regime 
pronounced its involvement in politics (Perham, 1970). 
The participation of authoritarian regime in Nigerian 
politics journeyed through 29 years (1966-1979 and 1983-
1999), with abrogation of civil rights and rule of law, 
fashioning prospect for Nigerian political ecology to be 
militarized, violent and chaotic, even after the departure 
of uncivil rule (Igwe, 2012). The resultant effect therefore 
advanced the abrasion of political assassination and 
violence as machination to settle political warfare which 
impedes the sustainability of Nigerian electoral democracy 
(Omotoso, 2013). 
Although, politically related murders are ubiquitous 
in every political ambiance across the world, while 
the degree of its occurrences designates its distinction. 
America and other nations of the world have their portions 
in political assassination. This includes the murder of 
Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther 
King. In Egypt, the killing of Awwal Sadat, Acquino of 
Phillipine, Patrice Lumumba of Congo as well as Indra 
of India are typical examples of political assassination 
(Olaopa et al., 2009).  In a similar direction, Jones & 
Olken suggested that the assassination of political leaders 
has been a primordial one, from Julius Caesar to Yitzhak 
Rabin. He further explicated that, had Adolf Hitler spent 
more time in the Munich beer outlet in 1939, he would 
2 Claude Ake quoted in Diamond, L. (1984, p.905). Nigeria in 
Search of Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 2(4), 905-927.
have been killed by a timed bomb. This thus represents 
the profound rhetoric of political murders in the Western 
democracies and the global South (Jones & Olken, 2008). 
Following parallel  trend in Nigeria,  polit ical 
assassination is rooted in political milieu. It is an 
instrument used both by the miscreants and the 
government to eliminate political opponents,3 that 
influence the practice and conduct of democracy to the 
extent that the dichotomy between crime and politics 
becomes wooly (Oladele, 2006), abetted with high 
magnitude of corruption, unemployment, poverty, 
malfunctioning security agencies and lack of political 
will in the part of government to protect law and order,4 
making socio-political environment more frightening for 
individuals in the country.5 Between 1960 to-date, Nigeria 
has experienced high profile political murders without 
devising adequate investigative measure by the national 
security agencies especially the Nigerian Police Force 
(NPF) to bring the perpetrators to book (Igbafe & Offiong, 
2007). Even when the police apprehend the suspects, low 
level ruffians becomes point of target while neglecting 
the politicians who sponsor them. Innocent citizens are 
arrested, just to hoodwink the general public that they 
have performed their civil obligations (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003); some of the political assassination cases 
are even attributed to armed robbery without justifiable 
reports. The reason is not far-fetched from illicit 
interference of political godfathers, inadequate resources, 
constitutional lacuna, involvement of political office 
holders, judicial ineptitude and institutional decay. The 
major concern of this paper is to interrogate how party 
politics and military coups impel political assassination 
in the post-independence Nigeria. Efforts are made 
to account for numerous cases of unresolved political 
killings from 1960 to 2016. The article further stressed out 
the connections between party politics, military coups and 
political related murders in post-colonial Nigeria. 
1. PARTY POLITICS AND ELECTORAL 
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  I N  P O S T - 
INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA
Democracy requires an institution through which citizens 
freehandedly permitted to choose political candidates. 
This required the creation of political parties with basic 
principles, tenets and ideologies. Thus, a political party 
constitutes a set of people agreed to form ideological 
canons, aimed to capture and control the government 
of a particular country. The primary objective of every 
political party is to canvass the citizens in the pre-election 
3 Sahara reporter, October 21, 2009.
4 See The Tide Newspaper, 15th 2013.
5 Ibid., p.10.
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environment as well as acquiring political leadership 
at the local, state and national levels. A more inclusive 
role and responsibility of political parties are to present 
candidates for electoral screening and mobilize citizens 
for political support in the electoral contest. According to 
Jinadu, he argued that in the western political philosophy, 
political parties are more functional than structural, 
characterized with two indispensable features, including 
facilitation of electoral choice(s) and management of 
governmental business under the institutional platform of 
a party. The institutional dais of political parties enlighten 
the political society regarding the selection of candidates, 
representation, canvassing and voting before the election 
(Jinadu, 2011). Thus, political parties are crucial for 
democratic survival in every political community.
Liberal democracy becomes a conventional form of 
political system across the world. Central to the notion of 
democratization is the subject of elections. As Diamond 
argues that elections are the “litmus test” of democratic 
system. Replace it with elections are fundamental 
mechanisms for choosing political representatives in 
democratic society. Voting remains a primary method for 
democratic reality. The necessity of elections can thus 
be considered as an instrument through which political 
leaders are held accountable to the public (Luqman, 
2009).  For an election to be free and fair, there are four 
conditions as suggested by Mackenzie, these include 
effective functioning of political parties, unbiased 
electoral umpire, independent judiciary obliges to interpret 
electoral laws and the public acceptance of the electoral 
rules.6  Having said that, the general conduct of an election 
requires what can be refers as electoral administration. 
Electoral administration implies the general management 
of the election, involving planning, budgeting, organizing, 
staffing, coordinating and reporting. It requires tripartite 
stages, that is, pre-election, election and post-election 
activities. The pre-election activities include registration 
of political parties, screening of candidates, delimitation 
of constituencies and registration of electorates. The 
election activities entail the conduct of election. While 
post-election environment accommodates pronouncement 
of election results and electoral litigation by the 
aggrieved political contestants who might not satisfy 
with election results. The complaints usually directed 
to a constitutionally electoral tribunal set up by the 
government (Ajayi, 2007).
Comparing the level  of  compliance with the 
fundamental ethos of democracy in the global North 
and South, a school of thought, Klusmeyer rightly 
noted that there is high level of adherence to the basic 
6 See Mackenzie quoted in Igbuzor. (2010). Managing the electoral 
Process: Civil Society perspectives. A paper presented at the 
Nigerian Bar Association Annual General Conference, Spidel 
Working Session on Public Interest and Development Law, Held in 
Kaduna on 24th of August, 2010.
rules and principles guiding political parties in western 
democracies. However, in the developing world, Nigeria 
inclusive, the democratic institutions are weak, with 
apparent subjugation of national interests over personal 
interests (Klusmeyer, 1995). In the so called ungovernable 
political spaces, personal interests are misconstrued as 
national interests. The political parties are uncoordinated 
to the extent that the wishes of the party leaders override 
the wills of the general member of the party. Since 
Nigeria’s independence to the present, political parties 
have become an agent of disintegration rather than 
integration, therefore, raises a fundamental question as 
whether the institutional creation of the parties or the 
membership is the obstructive pillars that hamstrings 
democratic development in the country. Human Rights 
Watch observed that, indiscipline within the Nigerian 
political parties infiltrates and triggers tension between 
the political supporters and the opponents (Ibid., p.15). 
Reference to the numerous electoral dystopias in 
Nigeria includes that of 1959, 1965, 1993 and post 
2011 election crises. According to Anifowose electoral 
crisis emanates as a result of the struggle for power and 
hegemonic tendency of the incumbent political party. 
He further argued that the 1959 elections conducted 
were marred with intimidation and violence as well as 
stuffing of ballot boxes, destruction of lives and properties 
(Anifowose, 1982). Similarly, Post observed that the 
application and adoption of ethnicity and regional forces 
as common tactic to win political race by the NCNC, NPC 
and AG results to electoral violence that circumscribes 
1959 election. The prominent among electoral crises 
witnessed in the country is that of 1964, between Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo and S. L. Akintola who served as the 
Premier of Western region. The crisis led to the detention 
of major leaders of the party—Action Group (AG), Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo and Anthony Enahoro were imprisoned 
and charged with treason felony by the court of law; this 
occurrence eventually fascinated military take-over in 
Nigeria’s democratic space (Post, 1963). Osaghae (1998) 
argued that, the pre and post electoral violence led to the 
collapse of the first republic. Hence, “winning elections 
became a life and death struggle which justifies all 
means—fair or foul”.7
In a bid to win election at all cost, Ige posited that, 
political coalitions were employed as an instrument for 
electoral triumph. The political parties that engaged in this 
logic include NNDP and NPC that formed the Nigerian 
National Alliance (NNA), the AG and NCNC formed 
the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The 
amalgamation and formation of the two political parties 
were necessary as a strategy to defeat opposition (Ige, 
1995). In the same vein, Falola et al. (1991) defensively 
justified the amalgamative contrivance of the political 
7 Ake, 1983 quoted in Joseph (2008, p.21).
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parties; they argued that the political consolidation was 
needed to defeat the opposition in the electoral face-
off. The desire to triumph in the election results in major 
crises that eclipsed Nigeria’s first republic. The collapse 
of democratic regimes in the first republics which provide 
political platform for military governance therefore 
empowers the authoritarian sect to engage in the political 
affairs of the nation. 
The military ruled for uninterrupted thirteen years 
before a new civilian government was constituted in 
1979 for the second republic. The authoritarian regime 
of Murtala/Obasanjo constituted the Federal Electoral 
Commission (FEDECO), saddled with the responsibility 
of conducting elections of July/August 1979. The 
government also established electoral tribunal to resolve 
electoral dispute related cases in the country. The 
declaration of election results generates controversies 
among the political parties, for instance, both the 
FEDECO and judiciary were alleged in conspiracy with 
the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which was declared 
as having majority in the National Assembly and the 
winner of presidential election. The implacable crisis 
generated by the controversial election subsumed the 
illegitimacy of political administration of former President 
Shehu Shagari (Ibid., p.20).
In 1983, a transitional effort championed by Shehu 
Shagari Adminitration was disregarded by the opposition, 
seen as skewed political platform for the electoral contest. 
Discontentment by the opposition parties regarding the 
election results of 1979 were also repeated in 1983. 
The electoral institution (FEDECO) put in place by the 
former regime NPN was reconstituted, and thus, making 
opposition parties to be suspicious of election rigging. 
Despite a series of allegations against the incumbent 
regime, the elections were conducted; however, the 
general conducts of the elections was considered 
fraudulent and full of malpractices and improprieties. The 
political climate therefore led to the denunciation of the 
election results, especially in some states like Ondo, Oyo 
and Anambra. Consequently, FEDECO offices were burnt 
in the above mentioned states, igniting electoral violence 
which propelled the killings of some political colossus 
in NPN, considered to have orchestrated the electoral 
rigging. The electoral violence triggered military take-over 
in the country, thus back to the doomsday of authoritarian 
political epoch. The new military government constituted 
by Muhammadu Buhari/Tunde Idiagbo bunged all 
democratic institutions and apprehended some political 
office holders alleged of corruption (Ibid.).
“Between 1991 and 1993, Nigeria had a kind of 
political novelty called ‘Diarchy’ that combined civil rule 
and military dictatorship in one administration headed by 
the military-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida” (Ibid., 
p.6). An effort was made by the military government 
headed by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1993 to 
conduct another election, the preparation for another 
democratic journey raised peoples’ hope and aspiration for 
majoritarian rule that provides opportunity for rule of law 
and fundamental human rights of the citizens. The major 
contestants in the election were Moshood Abiola, a South 
Westerner who contested under the political auspices of 
SDP and Alhaji Tofa, a Northerner, who contested under 
the political dais of NRC. Moshood Abiola was declared 
a winner of the election by the electoral commission. 
Nevertheless, the military government headed by 
Ibrahim Babangida declared that, he was not satisfied 
with the election results. This generates a great protest 
in the country especially in the South Western Nigeria. 
Therefore, the protest led to imprisonment of Moshood 
Abiola who later died in prison yard. Prior to the demise 
of Moshood Abiola, the military president declared 
Interim Government headed by Ernest Shonekan, the 
regime was later toppled by the military which later 
produced Major-General Sanni Abacha, Abacha died on 
the mantle of leadership. As a result of Abacha’s death, 
General Abdulsalam Abubarkar took over the mantle of 
leadership, and he served as the last military president in 
Nigeria.
Shortly, after the military reassurance to hand-over 
power to civilian regime in 1999 under the authoritarian 
political leadership of General Abdulsalami Abubarkar, 
elections were conducted which restored former military 
dictator, Olusegun Obasanjo as newly democratically 
elected President in Nigeria, therefore, symbolizes 
another political expedition to Nigerian fourth republic, 
inaugurated on 29 May 1999. The journey through the 
fourth republic was marked by another historic epoch in 
sustaining democratic politics in Nigeria. According to the 
International Crisis Group report 
democratic government has been uninterrupted for more 
than a decade, but the quality of elections since the return to 
civilian rule in 1999, of which these are the fourth, has declined 
continually. 1999 polls that swept General Olusegun Obasanjo 
and the PDP party to power were flawed but generally accepted 
by Nigerians glad to see the back of a repressive military 
dictatorship. Over subsequent years, Obasanjo and the ruling 
party—an alliance of oligarchs with close links to the military 
—consolidated their grip on power. In 2003 his mandate was 
renewed in a vote that was decried by observers as heavily 
rigged.8 
Olusegun Obasanjo ruled for 8 years, however, the 
former President managed to elongate his tenure, the 
legislative institution that would have been instrumental to 
his third term agenda discarded the proposition. As a result 
of expiration of Obasanjo’s political tenure, elections were 
conducted in 2003. The International election monitoring 
groups emphasized that 2003 elections were marred with 
violence, rigging and sorts of electoral criminalities. 
However, the idealism of democratic practice worthwhile 
depends on the general even handedness, freeness and 
8 International Crisis Group report (2012).
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fairness of an election. To achieve these, observing and 
monitoring the election become indispensable cognate of 
democratic development in every political orb. 
This calls for election observation which has been a 
mechanism designed by advanced democracies through 
the establishment of international election monitoring 
organizations to legitimatize democracy all over the 
world. It is important to cue here that the major elections 
conducted shortly after Nigerian independence were 
marred by rigging, violence, impropriety and all sorts of 
electoral manipulations. Consequently, the interventions 
of international election monitoring bodies necessitate the 
safeguarding of democracy from electoral immodesty in 
sustaining ethical standard for democratic advancement in 
Nigeria. Observing election transcends the conduct of an 
election; it involves pre- election assessment, the election 
itself and the post-election activities. The international 
election observers play a dominant role as watchmanship 
in homogenizing, standardizing, and appraising electoral 
integrity across the globe.
With similar outlook, prior the rejection of Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s third term bid, another election was conducted 
in 2007 which led to the emergence People’s Democratic 
candidate, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The conduct and 
general administration of the election was championed 
by Professor Maurice Iwu, who served as the chairman 
of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
in Nigeria. The international and local election observers 
considered the election as the worst in the political history 
of the country. Nevertheless, Umaru Musa Yaradua 
was declared a winner inof the election. However, the 
former President publicly declared that the election 
that brought him to power was rigged and ensnared 
in electoral disorders. The observation of the former 
President Umaru Musa Yaradua on electoral misconducts 
triggered his political will for setting up electoral 
reform committee led by Justice Muhammed Uwais 
(Rtd). The terms of reference of the committee were to 
provide corrective measures to numerous anomalies in 
Nigeria’s electoral acts. The committee came out with 
recommendations which include independent candidature, 
Political Parties registration and regulatory commission 
(PPRRC), Constituency Delimitation Commission 
(CDC), establishment of Electoral Offenses Commission 
(EOC) jut to mention but few. These recommendations 
were forwarded to the National Assembly for final 
ratification. However, the proposal witnessed a lot of 
setback. The suggested solutions were not holistically 
implemented in the legislative chamber. Immediately 
after the public declaration of the demise of President 
Umaru Musa Yaradua, the then Vice President, Goodluck 
Jonathan enthroned to fill the vacant post as the acting 
Nigerian President. This was done in accordance with the 
constitutional guidelines of the country. The emergence 
of Goodluck Jonathan as the acting President provides 
opportunity for him to contest in the 2011 presidential 
election under the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). 
The election was considered free and fair by the various 
international and local election observers. The general 
administration of the election was coordinated by 
Professor Attahiru Jega, the former chairman of INEC. 
This becomes historic in Nigeria’s political history 
(Alabi & Sakariyau, 2013). Despite the high level of 
transparency in the election, the election witnessed post-
election violence especially in the Northern Nigeria, this 
is because of political victory of Goodluck Jonathan who 
hailed from South-South (Ploch, 2013). It is important 
to note here the recurrence of ethno-religious politics 
that has problematized the country. Prior the expiration 
of four years tenure of President Goodluck Jonathan, 
another election was set in motion, the electoral 
contestation was between President Goodluck Jonathan 
and Muhammadu Buhari. Muhammadu Buhari was 
declared a winner in 2015 by the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC). One of the factors to be 
noted here is that, the political era experienced a peaceful 
transition from the incumbent regime to opposition party 
which becomes a landmark in Nigeria’s political journey. 
The above political scenario pinpoints tumultuous 
political expedition of Nigerian since independence. As 
rightly notes by Igwe that 
until the present political dispensation, since independence 
in 1960, Nigeria’s efforts at democratization never succeeded 
beyond six years. Since the (First Republic) 1960-1964 general 
elections, electoral violence, which was eventually indirectly 
terminated, has become a common feature of elections in Nigeria. 
It is pertinent to know that each set of elections in Nigeria up 
to this date seemingly deepened the culture of violence. This 
is reflected in the inter- and intraparty clashes centered on 
overblown personality politics riddled with bitter struggles for 
domination and control of party and power for selfish or sectional 
interests. This has reduced local and national politics to a contest 
of personality, centered on money and self, instead of ideology 
centered on superior issues. This contradiction has rubbed 
Nigeria’s polity of content and substance and reduced electoral 
processes to mere routine. (Ibid., p.6)
Therefore,  i t  can be argued that  the country 
has experienced turbulent political history with its 
manifestation in electoral misconducts and disruption of 
political regimes by the military invasion in Nigeria’s 
body politics. Violence, assassination, ethnic and religious 
bigotries exemplified Nigeria’s political experiments. In 
this regard, the next section looks into various military 
coups that result in political assassination of political 
office holders and the military officers. 
2. TOWARDS DIARCHY: THE TREND OF 
POLITICAL ASSASSINATION IN POST-
INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA 
The etymological use of the concept “assassination” 
was first employed in the medieval era to illustrate the 
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killings of prominent Christians by the “Hashshashing”, 
a clandestine Islamic group (Ibid., p.8). The existence 
of such secret group is traced to eighth and fourteenth 
centuries, empowered to kill the Abbasid elites who 
opposed its principles. The historical assumption of 
the origin is conventionally employed to represent 
murder committed by individuals or groups, especially 
if the victim is a political juggernaut within a political 
community. Most cases of assassination are understood 
within the continuum of politics. The reason behind the 
execution of such evil-project is usually considered if 
the victim in question is a purported opposition of the 
incumbent regime. Within Nigeria’s context, assassination 
can be categorized into two, these include killing executed 
by groups of people and individuals. Both require careful 
planning, weapon procurement and getting accurate 
information about the movement of the targeted victim 
through the instrumentality of the hired assassins (Albert, 
2010). Historically, tracing the manifestation of political 
related killings in Nigeria, the political event of January 
15, 1966, in which military state coordinated a brutal 
episode that led to the collapse of first republic, can 
be considered as the origin of political assassination 
after the departure of British colonialist in Nigeria. The 
event led by late Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and the likes 
predominantly from Eastern Nigeria, entrapped some 
political office holders like late Festus late Okotiebo, the 
former Minister of Finance, late Sir Abubarkar Tafawa 
Balewa, the former Prime Minister of Nigeria, late Sir 
S. I. Akintola, the former Premier of Western Region. 
They were all killed by the military juntas; the coup 
was a partial success because the objectives behind the 
plot could not be fully realized after the coup, while the 
aftermath of the coup witnessed the emergence of Major 
General Johnson Thomas Umunakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi as 
the first military head of state in Nigeria, he ruled from 
January to July 1966. 
The second military coup in Nigeria took place on 
29th July, 1996. It resulted in the death of Major General 
Aguiyi-Ironsi and some top military officers including 
the Governor of Western region, Adekunle Fajuyi. After 
the coup General Yakubu Gowon became the head of 
state and a commander-in-Chief of armed forces. The 
second military coup led to protracted political unrest in 
the country, the height of which was a thirty months of 
civil war. By 1967, the existing four regions were sub-
divided into twelve states has a response to secession bid 
of Eastern Nigeria orchestrated by Col Ojukwu. According 
to McNeil, Major-General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, leader of 
the new Nigerian military government, was convinced that 
federalism was the problem, and on 24 May 1966 he issued 
Decree No.34, which transformed Nigeria into a unitary 
state. In a radio broadcast announcing the decree, Ironsi 
said his plan was “intended to remove the last vestiges of 
the intense regionalism of the recent past, and to produce 
the cohesion in the governmental structure which is so 
necessary in achieving...national unity” (McNeil, 2014) 
Therefore, an attempt to make Nigeria a constitutionally 
unitary state by Yakubu Gowon administration led to 
another military coup. The third martial wave occurred 
on 29th July 1975 piloted by Brigadier Muritala 
Mohammed which deposed the government of General 
Yakubu Gowon. Late Muritala Mohammed became 
the head of state after the coup and ruled for only six 
months. General Muritala was assassinated in a bloody 
coup. As a result of the death of Muritala Muhammed, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo emerged as fourth military 
president of the federal republic of Nigeria from February 
1976 to September 1979. The regime was succeeded 
by General Muhammadu Buhari following the coup 
announced by Brigadier Sanni Abacha on December 31 
1983. Subsequent to this occurrence, General Ibrahim 
Babangida came to power due to a coup announced by 
Lt. General Joshua Nimyel Dongoyaro on August 27th 
1985. In another related development, General Sanni 
Abacha became Head of State after the dethronement 
of existing Interim National Government (ING) headed 
by Chief Ernest Shonekan on November 17th 1993. 
Abacha’s regime was characterized with numerous state 
sponsored political murders and attempted assassination, 
this include killing of Kudirat Abiola and the likes. 
Immediately after the pronouncement of the death of 
Saani Abacha, the emergence of General Abubakar was 
pronounced on July 8th, 1993. The regime served as the 
last dictatorial regime witnessed by the country. General 
Abubakar handed over power to civilian government 
in 1999. In a series of military regimes as discussed 
above, some citizens that championed the termination of 
military regimes were killed, imprisoned, charged with 
treason felony’ (National Association of Seadog, 2006) 
while others such as Professor Wole Soyinka fled off to 
exile to escape political assassination organized by the 
military state. In this context, it can be argued that the 
Nigerian military state played a major role in political 
assassination. 
Prior the Nigeria’s returned to democratic rule in 1999, 
the country continued to witness astronomical increase in 
political assassination, religious crises due to tenacious 
involvement of godfatherism, electoral malpractices, 
rigging, corruption acquisition of private army and myriad 
of socio-political problems (Oshodi, 2007). Consequently, 
provides opportunity for destruction of lives and 
properties (Agba, 2011). According to Human Right 
Watch, more than 300 innocent Nigerians were killed as a 
result of pre and post-election violence that encapsulates 
2007 general elections in Nigeria (Ibid., p.41). Otite and 
Umukoro posit that, Nigerian democracy is characterized 
with detestable tradition such as offering money for 
political accomplishment through the instrumentality of 
political godfathers (Otite & Umukoro, 2010). This has 
been infused in Nigerian political culture, leaning on the 
political juggernauts to triumph in electoral contestation 
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through unsophisticated means. Having the support of 
godfathers, the procurement of weapons, electoral finance 
and recruitment of private army gives assurance for 
electoral conquest. The mobilization of canal instruments 
to win election at all cost makes democracy a dangerous 
game in the country. A typical manifestation of politics of 
godfatherism that metamorphosed in political upheaval 
include political rift that occurred between Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo and Ladoke Akintola which disrupted the 
political atmosphere of South Western Nigeria, and 
consequently transmuted in a military takeover in the 
country. Political godfatherism describes a situation in 
which very powerful and influential members of the elite 
class use their power, money and influence to determine 
who should rule or occupy a given political office and 
who impose these leaders on the people. The leaders are 
generally forced upon the masses through intimidation, 
harassment and an excessive use of money. Political 
godfathers act as the financial backbone for politicians who 
aspire to occupy political offices at all cost. Such political 
office holders usually become tied to the apron string of 
their godfathers. It is against this background that Igbuzor 
rightly explained the character of instrumental carnality of 
godfatherism in Nigerian political airspace that
political godfatherism is a term now reserved for God forsaken 
criminals who will go to any length; I mean any length to 
achieve their set goals of wielding political power including 
arson, intimidation, warning, flogging and sometimes 
assassination’. With the money diverted from the coffers of the 
Nigerian or State governments, they equipped their ‘army’ with 
the latest weapons with which their foot soldiers or political 
thugs recruited from amongst numerous jobless graduates and 
undergraduates from Nigerian and state universities to terrorize, 
kill and main their kits and kin who oppose them. There may 
have been numerous killings by orders from these  political 
godfathers. (Ibid., p.43) 
Thus, politics of victimization and bloodshed are 
therefore becomes the prominent mannerism of Nigerian 
democracy. In foregoing, political killings serve as a 
potent weapon in the hand of repressive political elites 
and military juntas to achieve political leadership. The 
table below shows numerous cases of unresolved political 
assassination since independence. 
Table 1 
Cases of Political Assassination From 1966-2016
Name Year Location of death Affiliation Position
Nature of 
killings Killer 
1 Tafawa Balewa 1966 Lagos Northern People’s Congress (NPC)
Prime minister and 
Head of Government Gunshot Military
2 Ahmadu Bello January 15, 1966. Sokoto 
Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC)
Premier of Northern 
Nigeria Gunshot Military
3 Aguiyi-Ironsi July 29, 1966 Lagos Nigeria Military Military Head of State Gunshot Military
4 Adekunle Fajuyi July 29th 1966 Oyo Nigeria Military Military Governor of western Nigeria Gunshot Military
5 Ladoke Akintola January 15
th 
1966 Oyo Action Group
Premier of western 
region Gunshot Military
6 Alfred Rewane October 6, 1995 Lagos National Democratic Coalition (NADECO)
Business man, 
Elder statesman and 
NADECO financier
Gunshot Military 
7 Shehu Musa Yaradua December 8
th 
1997
Abakaliki 
prison Military 
Military chief of staff 
and SDP Presidential 
candidate 
Poisoned Military 
8 Muritala Mohammed Feb 13, 1976 Lagos Nigeria Military Head of State Gunshot Military
9 Tunde Idiagbon 1999 Ilorin, kwara state Nigeria Military Military vice president Poisoned 
Yet to be 
identified
19 Moshood Abiola Lagos SDP Presidential winner of 1993 election Poisoned
Yet to be 
identified
20 Dele Giwa October 19, 1986 Lagos Newswatch Newspaper Editor Newswatch
Parcel of 
Bomb Military state 
21 Kudirat Abiola June 4 1994 Lagos SDP Business mogul Gunshot Military state 
22 Bola Ige Dec. 23, 2001 Oyo Alliance for Democracy (AD).
Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
23 Marshal Harry March 2003        Abuja FCT All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
ANPP Vice Chairman 
for the South-South 
Zone
Gunshot Yet to be identified
24 Aminosari Dikibo Feb. 6, 2004       Delta State PDP PDP National chairman Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
25 Ogbonnaya Uche February 8, 2003 Imo State All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
ANPP senatorial 
candidate for Orlu 
zone at Owerri
Gunshot Yet to be identified
To be continued
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Name Year Location of death Affiliation Position
Nature of 
killings Killer 
26 Andrew Agom March 4, 2004 Nassarawa People Democratic Party (PDP)
Former boss of 
Nigeria Airway and 
PDP board of trustee
Gunshot Yet to be identified
27 Alabi Okoju May 15, 2005 Osun Oranmiyan group
Leading financier 
Oranmiyan group, 
a socio-political 
organization
Gunshot Yet to be identified
28 Mr. Ikenna Ibor, March 27, 2003 Anambra State All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
ANPP councillorship 
candidate in Anambra 
State
Gunshot Yet to be identified
29 Odunayo Olagbaju 2001 Ile-Ife, Osun State
Alliance for Democracy 
(AD).
Osun State House of 
Assembly. Macheted 
Yet to be 
identified
30 Funsho Williams July 2006 Lagos People Democratic Party (PDP)
Lagos PDP 
governorship aspirant
stabbed and 
strangled
Yet to be 
identified
31 Ayo Daramola 2006 Ekiti State People Democratic Party (PDP)
Former World Bank 
consultant and PDP 
governorship aspirant 
in Ekiti State,
Gunshot Yet to be identified
32 Anthony Nwudo March 21, 2003 Ebonyi All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
ANPP House of 
Assembly aspirant, Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
33 Godwin Agbroko December 25
th 
2006 Lagos ThisDay Newspaper
chairman, This Day 
Editorial Board Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
34 Ade Awonusi January 7, 2002 Abuja
Confidential Secretary 
to the Chief Justice 
of Nigeria, Justice 
Mohammed Uwais
Confidential Secretary 
to the Chief Justice 
of Nigeria, Justice 
Mohammed Uwais
Stabbed Yet to be identified
35 Abayomi Ogundeji August 17, 2008 Lagos ThisDay Newspaper ThisDay Newspaper Editor Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
36 Bayo Ohu September 20
th 
2009 Lagos Guardian Newspapers
Assistant News Editor 
of The Guardian 
Newspapers
Gunshot Yet to be identified
37 Bagauda Kalto 1996 Abuja-Kaduna Road News magazine News magazine Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
38 Charles Nsiegbe November 21, 2009 Rivers State
People Democratic 
Party
Political associate of 
Rivers state governor, 
Rotimi Amechi
Gunshot Yet to be identified
39 Dipo Dina Monday, January 25, 2010 Ogun state
Action Congress of 
Nigeria (ACN)
Ogun state ACN 
governorship 
candidate
Gunshot Yet to be identified
40 Janet Oladape August 13th 2002 Ondo People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
Leader of People’s 
Democratic Party 
(PDP) in Odigbo LG
Clubbed Yet to be identified
41 Babatunde Elegbede May 5, 1994 Lagos Nigeria military
Former chief of Naval 
Staff and military 
Governor of Rivers 
state
Gunshot Yet to be identified
42 Lekan Owolabi March 1995 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
43 Captain Tunde Ashafa June 11, 1995 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
44 David Izegwere December 1995 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
45 Kayode Awosanya January 1996 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
46 Mrs Tajudeen Abiola February 9, 1996 Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
47 Alhaji Sama Kano April 8, 1996 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
48 Admiral Olu Omotehinwa May 22, 1996 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
49 Mrs Irene Obodo June 1996 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
Continued
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50 Chief Adejola Balogun June 15, 1996 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
51 Esther A. Tejuoso September 19,1996 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
52 Ahmed Onipede 2010 Lagos Alliance for Democracy (AD).
former special adviser 
on mineral resources 
to the governor of 
Lagos State, Bola 
Tinubu
Gunshot Yet to be identified
53 Alhaja Suliat Adedeji November 14, 1996 Ibadan Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
54 Toyin Onagoruwa December 1996 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
55 Engr. Adesoji A. Dina September 1998 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
56 Kola Tokunbo January 31, 1999 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
57 Patrick Okoye January 31, 1999 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
58 Sunday Ugwu September 9, 1999 Enugu Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
59 Igwe Francis Nwankwo
February 15, 
2000 Anambra Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
60 Nicholas Okhuakhua June 2000 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
61 Mohammed Shuaibu September 2000 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
62 Obatou Mumbo October 17, 2000 Onitsha Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
63 Idowu Braimoh November 5, 2000 Ondo Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
64 Joseph Osayande December 4, 2000 Edo Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
65 Chief Layi Balogun December 10, 2000 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
66 Monday Ndor August 19, 2001 Port Harcourt Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
67 Onyebuchi Ede August 23, 2001 Ebonyi Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
68 Chibueze Idah August 23, 2001 Ebonyi Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
69 Ogbonna Odimbaiwe August 23, 2001 Ebonyi Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
70 Ifeanyi Nnaji August 23, 2001 Ebonyi Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
71 Sunday Atte February 5, 2005 Kogi 
legislative council 
Yagba East local 
government
Leader of legislative 
council Yagba East 
local government
Gunshot Yet to be identified
72 Mr. S.A. Awoniyi January 7, 2002 Abuja
Former confidential 
secretary to a former 
chief of justice 
Muhammadu Lawal 
Uwais
Former confidential 
secretary to a former 
chief of justice 
Muhammadu Lawal 
Uwais
Stabbed to 
death
Yet to be 
identified
73 Eyo Eyo April 2002 Cross River
Former information 
officer attached to the 
state’s commissioner 
for agriculture in Cross 
River
Former information 
officer attached to the 
state’s commissioner 
for agriculture in 
Cross River
Gunshot Yet to be identified
74 Ifeanyi Igbokwe April 18, 2002 Lagos Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
75 Musa Dayo May 9, 2002 Bauchi Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
Continued
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76 Christopher Ogbonna May 26, 2002 Enugu Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
77 Maria-Theresa Nsa June 11,2002 Cross River Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
78 Igbafe and Offiong Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
79 Chief & Mrs. Barnabas Igwe
September 1, 
2002 Anambra State Nigeria Bar Association
Onitsha branch 
chairman of Nigeria 
Bar Association
Gunshot Yet to be identified
80 Mr. Ogbonnaya Uche February 8, 2003 Imo All Nigeria Peoples Party 
Former commissioner 
of commerce Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
81 E. Emenike February 13, 2003 Imo Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
82 Theodore Agwatu February 22, 2003 Imo
Former Principal 
secretary to the Imo 
state governor
Former Principal 
secretary to the Imo 
state governor
Gunshot Yet to be identified
83 Emily Omope March 3, 2003 Oyo Alliance for Democracy (AD).
Alliance for 
Democracy (AD) 
member
Acid attack Yet to be identified
84 Bala Mai-Haice March 17, 2003 Gombe People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
Chairman of 
People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) in 
Yamaitu Deba Local 
Government
Gunshot Yet to be identified
85 Ajibola Olanipekun June 20, 2003 Ibadan Senior Advocate of Nigeria A lawyer in Ibadan Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
86 Lateef Olaniyan July 16, 2005 Oyo Gunshot Yet to be identified
87 Professor Chimere Ikoku
October 20, 
2002 Enugu 
University of Nigeria, 
Nnsukka
Vice chancellor 
University of Nigeria, 
Nnsukka
Gunshot Yet to be identified
88 Ahmed Pategi August 15, 2002 Kwara Unknown Unknown Gunshot Yet to be identified
89 Mr. Anthony Ozioko July 27, 2005     Abuja People Democratic Party (PDP)
Peoples Democratic 
Party’s Assistant 
National Director, 
Research and 
Planning,
Gunshot Yet to be identified
90 Mr. Patrick Origbe June 3, 2005 Delta  People Democratic Party (PDP)
Principal 
administrative officer 
Uvwie LGA
Gunshot Yet to be identified
91 Mr. Felix Eboigbe August 2005 Edo People Democratic Party (PDP)
Councilor in Oredo 
local government of 
Edo state
Gunshot Yet to be identified
92 Chief Jesse Aniku July 2006 Plateau State ACD Gubernatorial aspirant of ACD Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
93 Captain Jerry Agbeyegbe Oct 12, 2004 Lagos State Nigeria Aviation Aviation Chief, Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
94 Mr. Esho Egbelu August 2004 Cross Rivers State Unknown Unknown Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
95 Chief Philip Olorunnipa April 2004 Kogi State
Former Kogi state 
electoral commissioner
Former Kogi 
state electoral 
commissioner
Gunshot Yet to be identified
96 Hon. Tony Dimegwu April 30, 2003 Imo State All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
An ANPP member 
of the House of 
Assembly
Gunshot Yet to be identified
97 Yemi Oni March 2003 Ekiti State Alliance for Democracy (AD). Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
98 Mr. Issa Zaria April 2003 Kwara State All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
Member All Nigeria 
Peoples Party (ANPP) Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
99 Mr. Luke Shingaba March 2004 Kogi state Unknown LG Chairmanship candidate Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
Continued
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100 Dr. Ayodeji Daramola August 14, 2006  Ekiti State People Democratic Party (PDP)
governorship aspirant 
of the Peoples 
Democratic Party 
(PDP) in Ekiti State,
Stabbed in 
the chest and 
strangled.
Yet to be 
identified
101 Onyewuchi Iwuchukwu April 19, 2003 Imo state 
All Nigeria Peoples 
Party (ANPP) Politician Gunshot
Yet to be 
identified
102 Alhaji Modi Fannani Gubio January 28, 2011 Borno State
All Nigeria Peoples 
Party (ANPP)
All Nigeria Peoples 
Party (ANPP) 
candidate
Gunshot Yet to be identified
103 Comrade Olaitan Oyerinde May 3, 2012, Edo State
Chairman of Lagos 
Campaign for 
Democracy (CD) 
between 1992 to 1994,
Private Secretary to 
the Edo State governor Gunshot 
Yet to be 
identified
104 Hon Monday Eleanya February 11 2016 Rivers state
Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP)
Former member of 
Rivers state House of 
Assembly
Gunshot Yet to be identified
Note. The above names do not comprise the total number of politically related killings since independence, there are other eminent politicians that 
were killed but their profiles could not be ascertained. 
Source: Author’s Compilation
Continued
3 .  THE  NEXUS BETWEEN PARTY 
POLITICS,  MILITARY COUPS AND 
POLITICAL ASSASSINATION IN POST-
INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA
The transition from colonial to post-colonial state in 
Africa witnessed numerous skyjackings of political power 
by the military. According to Godsmith, 
post-colonial experiments with elected government temporarily 
ended in most African countries in the 1960s, and military 
dictatorships and one-party regimes came to dominate the 
continent. The justification for such governments was often 
to build national unity, and the elections that were held during 
those years tended to be plebiscitary and non-competitive. 
(Goldsmith, 2015) 
Nigeria is not excluded from this abrasive political 
expedition. It can be recalled that, the first military 
coup that midwife the collapse of the first republic was 
not proficiently executed without bloodshed. Some 
political office holders were murdered basically to allow 
authoritarian regime obtains the mantle of leadership. It 
is pertinent to note that one of the distinctive components 
that result in the disruption of democratic order in Nigerian 
first republic is the intensification of ethnicity in party 
politics, designed as an archetypal platform for political 
consideration. Conventionally, the emergence of ethnic 
movements in Nigerian party politics aggravates the 
travail. Political contestants housed within the ethnic 
continuum rather than political parties and competence; 
it is these ethnic clusters that dictate the movement, 
selection, electoral performance and inter-party and intra-
party conflict resolution in Nigeria (Osaghae, 2003). 
Competition among the dominant ethnic groups, that is, 
Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba have circumscribed and endangered 
the political sustainability, leading to bloody civil war 
that lasted between 1967 and 1970 in the country. Despite 
the democratic transition in 1999, some observers have 
claimed that amplification of ethno-religious politics 
characterized the political events in the fourth republic. 
However, the legal restriction placed on the creation 
of ethnic political parties has not resolved the current 
conundrum of ethnicity in party politics. For instance, the 
electoral acts of 2006 prohibits political party membership 
created on ethnic platform, nevertheless, the formation of 
Alliance for Democracy (AD) was characterized as Yoruba 
political party in the Western Nigeria which established the 
attendance of ethnic politics in Nigerian political domain, 
as it was expressively observed by Olaniyan & Omotola 
(2015), that 
across various epochs in Nigeria’s transition, ethnicity has 
played an essentially contrasting role in the governance of the 
country during both colonial and post-independence eras, as 
well as under successive military and civilian regimes, with both 
positive and negative consequences. 
Therefore makes Kuenzia & Lambright conclude 
that Nigerian party politics is a “bereft of ideological 
commitments” (Kuenzia & Lambright, 2015).
Premised on the above condition, the consideration for 
ethnic affiliation beginning from autocratic transition to 
democratic regime in Africa, none of the African countries 
was liberated from political violence. Electoral violence 
emanates as a result of unresolved political, economic, 
religious and ethnic injustices in the pre-election and 
post-election environments (Ibid., p.6). Fraudulent 
election becomes a major attribute of Nigerian electoral 
democracy. The manifestation infused in election rigging, 
falsification of election results, intimidation of political 
agents and electorates as well as killing and maiming 
of innocent citizens of echoes in the major elections 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Join Us or Be Junked? Party Politics, Military Coups and Political 
Assassination in Post-Independence Nigeria 1966-2016
12
conducted from independence exacerbates the current 
dilemma of illiberal democratic tradition (Ibid., p.48). 
This position was rightly amplified by Chux Ibekwe and 
Akanmu Adebayo (2012) that:
Violent conflicts occur at party nominations and primaries 
and at campaign rallies. Often the goal . . . is to intimidate the 
electorate, assassinate political opponents, and cause general 
instability under the cover of which electoral malpractices (such 
as stealing voting materials, preventing the safe and orderly 
arrival of polling staff, etc.) may be carried out. . . . On election 
day, therefore, anarchy reigns. Candidates and their supporters 
are known to carry weapons into the polling station, fire guns 
into the air, snatch ballot boxes, stuff the boxes with pre-voted 
ballots, and force electoral officials to validate forged results. 
. . . Violent conflicts continue or re-emerge after elections. . . . 
Many candidates know that their mandate may be stolen at any 
stage by a more forceful opposition, especially if that were the 
incumbent—and this gives ready employment for political thugs 
and hooligans.
There are various reasons that propel electoral violence 
in Nigeria, Höglund (2009) provides explanatory structure 
of these factors in the following table:
Table 2
Causes of Electoral Violence
Conditions enabling the use of electoral violence Factors triggering electoral violence
Nature of Politics ●Patrimonial politics ● Violent actors participating in elections
●Conflict cleavages ●Biased police
●Violence as a legitimate Political tool
●Culture of impunity
●Access to arms
Nature of Elections ●Competitiveness ●Misuse of political rights
●Political mobilisation ●Militant mobilisation
●Stakes ●“Close races”
●Exposure to attacks
Electoral lnstitutions ●Systems creating clear winner and losers ● Political usage of electoral administration
●Few regulations about electoral conduct ●Election fraud
●Administration with few checks and little power ● Unwanted or unexpected outcome of the election
Source: Hoglung, 2009.
Moreover, the challenge of corrupt political leadership 
in both military and civilian administration facilitated 
by oil revenue prompts a deepening crisis of kleptocracy 
in post-independence Nigeria. Looting of the national 
treasury by the political class contributes to the current 
woes of endemic poverty, inequality and environmental 
degradation, while the socio-economic life of the ordinary 
citizens is driven by political connection. Corruption is 
therefore becomes a normal way of life in Nigeria. The 
notables among political elites live in affluence with larger 
percent of rural and urban populace living in penury. 
The prevalence of poverty in the socio-political fabric of 
the country fascinates the involvement of unemployed 
youths that have formed numerous deadly assemblages; 
these unemployed youths are being recruited as political 
hired-killers by the politicians. The major obligations 
of these idle youths include disruption of election 
campaigns, snatching of ballot boxes during election 
and killing of political opponents. Thus, the prevalence 
of chronic poverty as a result of unemployment in the 
country provides a fertile ground for electoral violence 
and political assassination in Nigeria. According to Osoba 
the problem coupled with the deadly nature of Nigerian 
politics which gives room for personal accumulation 
(Osoba,1996), thereby making the political system more 
cacophonous and violent. 
Concomitantly, the increasing proliferation of ethnic 
based policing group such as Odua People’s Congress 
(OPC) in the Southwestern Nigeria, Bakassi Boys in 
the Southeastern, Arewa People’s Congress in the North 
and Egbesu Boys in the Niger-Delta area provides a 
platform for insecurity in Nigerian political processes. 
The emergence and formation of these numerous ethnic 
security outlets are as a result of failure of formal security 
institution in combating crimes and ensuring the safety of 
the people. However, the informal multilayered policing 
taxonomies are being employed by politicians to promote 
political agenda. For instance, OPC has been adopted by 
politicians to terrorize and intimidate political opponents 
in the country. Similarly, Egbesu Boys and Bakasi Boys 
have been employed to stand against ethno-political 
struggle in the country. This therefore becomes a haven 
of refuge for each ethnic group to fight ethnic scores in 
Nigerian politics (Ibid., p.57). The institutional prospect 
of Nigerian party politics therefore susceptible to electoral 
violence and ethnic struggle for power that prompts 
political assassination, threats, and assaults during 
electoral processes which has enforced many political 
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contestants to dissuade from democratic participation in 
the country.
SUMMARY
This article addresses unresolved political murders 
inveigled by party politics and military governance in 
Nigeria. The belligerent mythology of Nigerian party 
politics that prompts the incursion of the military in 
democratic stratum becomes a mordant beginning of 
decadence political murders that routed through turbulent 
political confrontation between the political elites and the 
military leaders. Over the years, the disposition of party 
politics in Nigeria exceptionally represents a repudiation 
of the democratic order, associated with the assassination, 
violence, lawlessness and impunity. The dilemma of 
democratic burst is linked with the conduct of election 
and electioneering processes. Recognizing the myriad of 
electoral mismanagement, violence, ethnicity, corruption 
and poverty that survived through times and history, 
authorizes political assassination that journeyed through 
the collapse of the first republic, champed by the military 
state which moribund Nigeria’s political development. 
Considering the numerous military coups witnessed 
in post-independence Nigeria, it can be surmised that 
political killing was adopted by the authoritarian regimes 
to get rid of perceived political enemies and ethnically 
disparate military officers who might serve as obstruction 
to commandeer political leadership. It is in line with 
this argument that ethnicity played a major role in 
various military coups orchestrated by ethnic cabals. The 
assassination of some head of states through organized 
coup d’état’s masterminded by ethnic factions within the 
military leadership explicates the detrimental effect of 
ethnic politics in the country. 
In Nigeria, political killing remains a cataleptic 
instrument adopted by authoritarian regime, political 
godfathers and miscreant politicians to accomplish 
political mission. It constitutes a mechanism through 
which politicians perfected electoral conquest in the pre-
election, actual election and post-election processes. The 
criminal nature of Nigerian electoral politics marooned 
in excessive politicking and moneybags politics which 
provides institutional habitation for political murderers, 
thereby making a paradoxical perceptive of Nigeria’s 
democratic governance. The mechanism espouses by 
political elites in electoral conquest dwell within the 
spectrum of criminal enclave of political supporters 
that fuel the ember of violence, making it a normative 
political nomenclature in Nigerian party politics. The 
do or die nature of Nigeria’s politics influences the 
political culture of the people. Nonetheless, democracy 
has it is practice all over the world emphasizes liberal 
participation which encourages every citizen to engage 
in governance. Undoubtedly, Nigerian democratic system 
has been infected with political assassination, considering 
as an aberration in a liberal democratic order. It is 
obvious that, without providing an institutional structure 
that capable of enlightening political elites regarding 
the danger pose by incongruent political behaviours 
will be tantamount to democratic peril. To get rid of this 
predicament, engaging political parties through intra-
party and inter-party dialogues serve as a panacea for 
mitigating political assassination in Nigeria. Therefore, 
attitudinal change in the part of Nigerian political elites 
becomes indispensable. Noticeably, Nigerian police 
has been unable to fathom a single case of political 
assassination since 1966; therefore, there is a need for 
reform in Nigeria policing system, while independent 
of the judiciary becomes a curative measure for the 
sustenance of the Nigerian democratic experiment. 
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